Personal Radiation Detector Field Test and Evaluation Campaign by Chris A. Hodge, Ding Yuan, Raymond P. Keegan, Michael A. Krstich
DOE/NV/25946--235 
 
Personal Radiation Detector Field Test and Evaluation Campaign 
Chris A. Hodge, Ding Yuan, and 
 Raymond P. Keegan 
Remote Sensing Laboratory 
National Security Technologies, LLC 
P.O. Box 98521, MS RSL-44,  
Las Vegas, NV 89193 
Michael A. Krstich 
Department of Homeland Security 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, 
Assessments Directorate 
245 Murray Lane, Bldg 410, MS 7100, 
Washington, DC  20528 
ABSTRACT 
Following the success of the Anole1 test of portable detection system, the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office organized a test and evaluation 
campaign for personal radiation detectors (PRDs), also known as “Pagers”.  This test, “Bobcat”, 
was conducted from July 17 to August 8, 2006, at the Nevada Test Site.  The Bobcat test was 
designed to evaluate the performance of PRDs under various operational scenarios, such as 
pedestrian surveying, mobile surveying, cargo container screening, and pedestrian chokepoint 
monitoring.  Under these testing scenarios, many operational characteristics of the PRDs, such as 
gamma and neutron sensitivities, positive detection and false alarm rates, response delay times, 
minimum detectable activities, and source localization errors, were analyzed.  This paper will 
present the design, execution, and methodologies used to test this equipment for the DHS.   
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) 
sponsored testing, named Bobcat, of Personal Radiation Detectors (PRDs) at the National 
Nuclear Security Administration’s Nevada Test Site (NTS) as a Work for Others effort through 
the National Nuclear Security Administration.  The goals of the Bobcat test2,3 were to test the 
effectiveness of: 
• PRDs in detecting threat radionuclide in pedestrian surveying operations 
• PRDs in detecting threat radionuclide in mobile surveying operations 
• PRDs in detecting and localizing threat radionuclide in screening operations 
• Identification (ID)-capable PRDs in identifying and discriminating threat and nuisance 
radionuclide in screening operations 
• PRDs in detecting threat radionuclide in pedestrian chokepoint monitoring operations 
• PRDs in setting an exclusion area in support of personal safety considerations 
  
d4 
Alarm! 
Alarm 
stops 
d3 
d5 
TEST DESIGN  
TEST SCENARIOS 
PEDESTRIAN SURVEY (SCENARIO 1) 
In the pedestrian survey, the PRD was placed on the operator’s body 
as would be done while performing normal foot patrols. The PRD was 
placed at one of three locations on the body: on the hip near the 
source, on the hip away from the source, or on the chest.  Two straight 
operator walk-paths were marked on the ground past the sources using 
tape marked in feet at perpendicular distances (1 and 3m) from the 
source. Two PRDs were tested for each model. The main technical 
objectives are the effectiveness and the consistency of the radioactive 
source detection.  Figure 1 shows the layout of the test 
track for scenario 1 and Figure 2 shows the actual 
performance testing.  The tablet operator would record:  
1) Distance (d3-G) from start at which the first gamma 
alarm sounds; 2) Distance (d3-N) from start at which the first neutron 
alarm sounds; 3) Distance from start at which the last gamma alarm 
ends (d5-G); 4) Distance (d5-N)  from start at which the last neutron 
alarm ends; 5) Indicator of multiple gamma alarms (Y/N); and 6) 
Indicator of multiple neutron alarms (Y/N).  
PEDESTRIAN SURVEY (SCENARIO 1A) 
The setup of Scenario 1A is the same as that for Scenario 1 except 
that a single source was used for this test.  The tablet operator 
recorded:  The exposure rate at the defined start point (10 feet 
in front of the source); 2) The exposure rate at the 5-foot 
point (50% distance) before the source; 3) The exposure rate 
at the perpendicular point; 4) The exposure rate at the 5-foot 
point (50% 
distance) past 
the source; 
and 5) The 
exposure rate 
at the defined 
end point (10 
feet past the 
source).  
Figure 3 
shows the 
track layout 
for this 
scenario. 
0% 
50% 
100% 
50% 
0% 
Figure 2 – Pedestrian Surveys: Walking the 
Track.  DNOD observer (l), Tablet 
Operator (m), PRD Operator (r). 
Figure 1 – Schematic of 
Scenario 1 – 
Pedestrian 
Surveys 
Figure 3 – Schematic of 
Scenario 1a  
  
MOBILE SURVEY (SCENARIO 2) 
Scenario 2, schematically shown in Figure 5, is a simulation of a 
mobile survey using a PRD inside a patrol vehicle as it performs 
normal road patrols. Three 15-passenger vans were used for this 
test and the 15 PRDs were distributed between the vans allowing 
the PRDs to be tested simultaneously.  Figure 5 is a photograph at 
the actual test. 
As Figure 6 shows, the PRDs were mounted on the passenger side 
windows of each vehicle (plastic shower caddies were used to hold 
the PRDs) and oriented so that the PRD operator sitting in the 
adjacent seat could read them.  
Three vans were driven past one source at 5 and then at 25 mph. A 
full data set was collected for the first copy of a given PRD model 
before proceeding to the next copy of that model. The major 
objective of this scenario was to test the effectiveness and 
consistency of the radioactive source detection with a PRD in a 
moving vehicle. The test results can be additionally used for 
assessing performance as a function of vehicle speed during 
mobile survey operations.  Recorded Results were:  1) the type of 
alarm sounded (e.g., gamma, neutron, none), and 2) the 
maximum exposure/count rate reading. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Scenario 2 - Mobile Surveys Figure 6 – Mobile Surveys; PRD Orientation 
SCREENING (SCENARIO 3A) 
Scenario 3A is a simulation of an everyday operation where an operator uses a hand-held PRD to 
locate a source upon a self-cue (own alarm) or an external cue (somebody else’s alarm or 
indication). The goal is to locate the source; not to identify it. The setup of this scenario for a single 
Container Express (CONEX) shipping container as Figure 7 shows.  It involves the placement of 
sources inside the CONEXs. The CONEXs were lined up on the ground about 40 feet apart, but 
 
Figure 4 – Schematic of 
Scenario 2 – 
Mobile Surveys 
  
angled at about 45º to each other so that one PRD 
operator could not see the other. CONEXs 
contained 17,000kg of Naturally Occurring 
Radioactive Material (NORM), 1 inch of steel and 
12 inches of plywood as shielding material, or no 
shielding. The sources were placed in the 
CONEXs along the midline at 1m height.  
The PRD operator held the PRD in hand and 
walked in one direction along the side of the 
CONEX, surveying along a line marked on the 
outside of the CONEX on the plane of the source. 
The point where the source was located was determined by observing where the gross count rate 
was the greatest. The maximum time allocated to 
the PRD operator to locate was 2 minutes. 
Depending on the exposure/count rate, the PRD 
may or may not have set off the alarm during this 
operation.  
The maximum exposure/count rate for gamma 
and neutrons, if available, was recorded with the 
start and stop times. The tablet operator stood by 
the CONEX and recorded the results. The PRD 
operator moved onto the next CONEX as shown 
in Figure 8. The results recorded were: 1) the 
observed horizontal location of the source; 2) the 
gamma exposure rate at identified location; 3) the 
neutron count rate at identified location; and 4) 
the start and stop time.   
Figure 8 -– Photograph of Scenario 3a Testing 
SCREENING IDENTIFICATION (SCENARIO 3B) 
In scenario 3B, the operator used a PRD with identification capability to identify a source after 
localization. The Thermo Electron Interceptor was the only PRD with this capability. The sources 
were arranged within the CONEXs using the same configuration as in Scenario 3A (see Figure 7).  
The PRD operator placed the PRD on the point on the side of the CONEX closest to the source and 
was given up to 30 minutes to perform the identification.  Spectra were extracted from the PRD and 
provided for inclusion into the Bobcat database. The technical objective of this scenario was to 
assess the effectiveness of the PRD in identifying threat radionuclide and naturally occurring 
radionuclide during screening operations. The data recorded included: 1) the recorded spectra as 
applicable; 2) the displayed choice of radioisotopes from the PRD library list; 3) the maximum 
exposure/count rate reading (gamma and neutron as applicable); and 4) the start and stop time. 
CHOKEPOINT MONITORING (SCENARIO 4) 
In scenario 4, a PRD is used to monitor the passage of people. The operator stands at a pedestrian 
chokepoint while the concealed source on a person moves toward the operator in a crowd of people 
d1 
Figure 7 – Schematic of Scenario 3 
  
(see Figure 9). In a regular operational environment, the operator would wear the PRD on the hip 
facing the pedestrian line and, therefore, the source. 
A source was placed in a backpack and the backpack carrier 
walked through the chokepoint in a line of 11 
other backpack carriers with similar source-
free backpacks. Figure 10 shows backpack 
carriers walking through the chokepoint. 
Only one of the carriers had a source, and 
in some of the runs no carrier had a source. 
The PRDs were located on the front of the 
operators to facilitate monitoring of the 
instrument while watching the carriers. In this 
scenario, the PRD operators were also tablet operators 
and recorded their own results. data recorded:  1) the type 
of alarm that sounded (gamma, neutron, balance, low-
energy); 2) the carrier number directly in front of the operator 
when measured exposure rate begins to decline, indicating that the 
peak has just passed; and 3) the maximum exposure/count rate. 
Figure 10 – Scenario 4:  Pedestrian Chokepoint Monitoring. 
PERSONAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS (SCENARIO 5) 
For this scenario, an operator used a handheld PRD to 
determine the safety exclusion area around a source for a 
given predetermined exposure rate limit. The PRD operator 
held the device in front of the body and walked toward a 
source while observing the exposure rate reading. The 
PRD operator stopped when the PRD displayed the 
predetermined exposure rate for the exclusion area.  
In this simulation, the operators walked toward the source 
simultaneously from two directions (see Figure 11).   Figure 11: Scenario 5—Personal Safety 
Figure 9 – Diagram of  
Scenario 4:  Chokepoint  
    Monitoring Showing   
        the PRD Operators  
             on the  Flanks    
                  and the Subjects 
                      up the Middle. 
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In practice, the two paths were 180° apart (also called the 12 and 6 o’clock positions), so that two 
PRDs were tested simultaneously.   
In this simulation, the operators walked toward the source simultaneously from two directions (see 
Figure 11).   
Figure 11 shows a circular exclusion area of radius d1 from the location of the source located at the 
center. The exclusion area boundary was preset using a calibrated ion chamber instrument. The 
PRD operators were not told the true position of the 2mR/hr point. The distance d2 is the exclusion 
area determined by the PRDs. Ideally, d1 and d2 would be the same. For this scenario, the exclusion 
area was set at 2mR/hr. The objective of this test was to assess the effectiveness and the consistency 
of each model of the PRD in setting up an exclusion area in support of personal safety 
considerations. The distance from the source at the 2mR/hr reading was recorded. 
TEST ARTICLES 
Fifteen modes of PRDs were tested during this campaign.  PRDs are pager-sized instruments that 
incorporate a gamma detector (many models also have a neutron detector).  
PRDs are worn on the body (hip or chest) as a uniform accessory, clear of obstruction from heavy 
metal accessories, especially weapons. They set off an alarm when a gamma or neutron radiation 
field exceeds a preset threshold indicating the presence of a radiation source. The alarm may be 
audible, visual, vibrating, or a combination of these modes. PRDs can be used to warn the user 
when radiation levels present a safety concern. Some PRDs have radionuclide identification 
capability. 
Nine vendors participated in Bobcat. Together, these vendors provided 20 PRD models for testing. 
15 were chosen for testing.  
SOURCE MATERIAL 
Source materials were chosen to establish performance relative to select threat objects and typical 
sources found in the stream of commerce.  Sources were often combined to test against specific 
masking or shielding scenarios.  For example, medical, industrial, and SNM sources were often 
placed in and around NORM material to test the instruments ability to discriminate between the two 
sources.  Examples of these sources are: 
? Medical sources  
– 131I, 99mTc 
? Industrial Sources 
– 241Am, 60Co, 137Cs/AmBe, 192Ir 
? SNM 
– HEU, Pu, DU 
? Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM) 
– Cat litter, roofing tiles, fertilizer 
 
QUALITY ASSURANCE 
There were several aspects of quality assurance and quality control that were addressed to assure 
data integrity.  All instrumentation was accepted and tested using  American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI) criteria4,5,6.  All operators, instrumentation and data collectors were trained, tested, 
and certified against written procedures to assure minimal performance and level of understanding. 
An HPGe spectrum was collected for each unique configuration.  Not only was this used to assure 
configuration control and documentation, but it also served as a comparison for the limiting 
  
performance of any of the test articles.  Daily background measurements were also obtained with 
the same HPGe system to document ambient background and its possible fluctuations. 
Along with database control of testing and configurations, photo-documentation was obtained on 
testing and on all unique configurations (see configuration control for additional details). 
Quality control (QC) engineers performed a statistical review of acquired data.  These engineers 
selected a few representative cases and tracked the data from the point of raw data collection in the 
field all the way through the final report to assure data integrity during collection, recording, and 
reduction. 
Figure 12 -- Collection of Configuration HPGe 
"Ground Truth" 
The database contains numerous QC checks 
to prevent erroneous data entry, such as drop-
down menus to limit possible input to only 
known values.  The database also performed 
several logical checks to assure accurate raw 
data input.  Where possible information 
(source, NORM, configuration, instrument, 
operation ID, etc.) was input via bar code to 
assure accurate data input.  All configurations 
were  independently verified by multiple 
personnel against a pre-written schedule.  In 
most cases, data was scrutinized for 
consistency (e.g. operators entered the 
appropriate speed) prior to the 
commencement of the next test. 
SOURCE CONFIGURATIONS 
Configurations were selected to establish 
performance relative to select cargo 
configurations found in the stream of 
commerce.  Configuration control was 
maintained by test scientists using the 
database controls described above, photo-
documentation (Figure 13), and required the 
collaboration of multiple test scientists.  The 
specific test scenarios are described later in 
this paper.  There were nine test 
configurations for scenario 1, six for scenario 
2, six for scenario 3, five for scenario 4, and 
one for scenario 5.   
Variation in the configurations included 
differing sources, differing source position for 
location scenarios, differing source/masks 
combinations (e.g., Pu with NORM), different 
shielding combinations (e.g., U surrounded by 
1” steel), speed for mobile and portal testing, 
and detector-to-source distance. 
Figure 13 – Example of Configuration Photo-
Documentation Showing HP Measurements, 
Distance Documentation, and Source 
Configuration. 
DATA COLLECTION 
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Data were recorded in near real-time with the use of dedicated 
portable tablet computers and tablet operators.  The data collection 
software employed drop-down menus and fill out tables to allow 
for faster, more accurate, and more consistent recording of data.  
Bar code readers were used for identification of test case, 
instrument, and operator to speed the process and minimize input 
errors. 
Tablet operators and instrument operators were required to verbally 
verify all data prior to submission.  The data was then immediately 
downloaded via WiFi link where software used a set of rules to 
check on data integrity and accuracy prior to allowing the operator 
to continue.  
Figure 14 –  Barcode 
scanning of a PRD during 
Typical Data Recording 
Test case configuration data 
were also input using a tablet 
computer.  Upon completing 
the setup of a specific test case, 
the test coordinator would choose the predetermined test case 
identification and enter the data associated with NORM, CONEX, 
source, source position, data documentation photos, and “ground 
truth” HPGe spectra.  Instrument operators would complete their 
data acquisition through a series of questions and confirmatory 
read-backs of information (see Figure 13). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Bobcat test quantified and documented the following results: 
• Conclusions should focus on what the successful design and execution of a complex test 
campaign that evaluated a broad range and large number of systems. 
• Report provided to Federal, State, and local emergency responders (to be available on the 
Responder Knowledge Base website to qualified individuals). 
• Participating vendors received summary of performance of their individual system to aid system 
improvement. 
• Results used to guide development of performance specification of next generation hand-held 
radiation detection systems being.   
When choosing instruments for radiation detection, the Bobcat test campaign has demonstrated that 
the instruments’ primary use needs to be well defined. 
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